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INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS IN VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF SURVIVING SPOUSES
By MELVIN J. SYKES*
I. THE PROBLEM
The Maryland Code provides that surviving spouses
may not be deprived by will of a minimum share of the
"estate" of the decedent.' The Code provisions are the cul-
mination of a long struggle of conflicting tendencies.' In
Glanville's time, in the twelfth century, one-third of a hus-
band's personal estate was the "wife's part" and one-third
the "children's part", the husband's power of testation be-
ing limited to the remaining one-third when there were
wife and children. The wife's rights were enforced by the
writ de rationabili parte bonorum, which gradually fell
* A.B., Johns Hopkins, 1943; LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1948.
'In general, Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sees. 313-330, and "... If the election
be of dower in lands and the legal share of the personal estate, the said
surviving husband or widow shall take dower in lands and one-third of the
surplus personal estate (if the deceased spouse shall be survived by de-
scendants) and dower in lands and one-half of the surplus personal estate
(if the deceased spouse shall not be survived by descendants) and no more.
If the election be of the legal share of both real and personal estate, the
surviving husband or wife shall take one-third of the lands as an heir and
one-third of the surplus personal estate (if the deceased spouse shall be
survived by descendants) and one-half the lands as heir and one-half
the surplus personal estate (if the deceased spouse shall not be survived
by descendants but shall be survived by a father or mother) ; and Two
Thousand Dollars, or its equivalent in property or any interest therein,
at its appraised value, and one-half of the residue of the lands as an heir
and one-half of the surplus personal estate remaining (if the deceased
spouse shall not be survived by descendants or a father or mother) and
no more," Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 93, Sec. 314.
Statutes frequently provide for one-third as the minimum share. See 1
PAGE ON WLS (1941) 412.
See Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance (1936), 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 139.
Election statutes now exist In almost every jurisdiction. See Comment,
The Present Status of "Illusory" Trusts - The Doctrine of Newman v.
Dore Brought Down to Date (1945), 44 Mich. L. Rev. 151; Notes, 64 A. L. R.
466 (1930), 112 A. L. R. 649 (1938).
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into disuse and was completely abolished in 1837, when
English law allowed a husband to bequeath all his per-
sonalty as he wished
About the first quarter of the nineteenth century, States
began to pass election statutes to supplement dower rights,
returning to the policy behind the ancient writ,4 since
dower as an instrument of protection for the wife was
becoming substantially "an illusion and deception".' These
statutes secure an economic interest in the marriage rela-
tion,' often protecting husband as well as wife.7 They also
tend to promote the social interest in the stability of the
family, and widows especially appeal to the social interest
in the protection of the economically dependent. On the
other hand, some widows are in fact not economically
dependent; the young second wife who claims her husband's
fortune as against his grown children after only a few
years of marriage arouses but little sympathy; and common
law tradition has regarded with suspicion attempts to limit
the jus disponendi of private property.'
The election statutes have not solved the problem they
were designed to meet. Instead, the question of the extent
to which the law should protect a surviving spouse against
'7 Win. IV and 1 Viet. c. 26 (1837) ; PAGE, supra, n. 1, 408. An interest-
ing and detailed summary of the protection of widows against disinheritance
may be found in Cahn, supra, n. 2.
'The New York statute, which is the most thorough modern legislation
on the subject, was passed in 1929. On the New York statute generally, see
BEECHLER, ELECTIONS AGAINST WILLS; SEC. 18, NEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE
LAW (1940). For early Maryland law concerning renunciation see Griffith
v. Griffith, 4 H. & McH. 101 (Md. 1798) ; Coomes v. Clements, 4 H. & J. 480
(Md. 1819).
'Report of Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates
(N. Y.) Leg. Doc. (1928) No. 70, 9; Leg. Doc. (1930) No. 69, 83. With
personalty now the characteristic form of wealth and corporate ownership
of realty common, it is true that in most estates of worldly men "dower In
real estate does not exist". See O'Shea, Surviving Spouses in New York
(1934), 8 St. John's L. Rev. 245.
' In this respect they work toward the same social end as dower. curtesy,
and husband's estate during coverture at common law, and the wife's right
to maintenance and support today. The purpose of the election statutes
was to correct the "glaring inconsistency in our law which compels a man
to support his wife during his lifetime and permits him to leave her practi-
cally penniless at his death". Leg. Doec. (N. Y.) (1928) No. 70, 12; Leg. Doc.
(1930) No. 69, 86. See also Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic
Relations (1916), 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177.
Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 330; Harrison v. Prentice, 183 Md. 474,
38 A. 2d 101 (1944); Hayes v. Seavey, 69 N. H. 308, 46 A. 189 (1898).
'8Cf. Comment, supra, n. 2.
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disinheritance is being fought out on a new battle ground,
namely, the inter vivos transfer. The cases record numer-
ous, often successful, attempts to accomplish by inter vivos
transfer what the statutes forbid to be done by will. Insofar
as these attempts are sanctioned by the law, the election
statutes are merely a trap for the unsophisticated.' Legisla-
tures have not generally regulated inter vivos transfers
by spouses,10 and the case law has been marked by that
uncertainty which reflects the same delicately balanced,
conflicting considerations of policy which underlay the
vacillations of the law with regard to testamentary trans-
fers prior to the passage of the election statutes. It is the
purpose of this article to discuss how courts, especially
the Maryland Court of Appeals, have treated inter vivos
transfers challenged by a surviving spouse.
The problem, technically, is one of statutory interpre-
tation. The election statutes provide for a legal share in
the "estate" of the deceased spouse.1 The question there-
fore is: Under what conditions will an inter vivos "trans-
fer" be regarded as ineffectual to take the property trans-
ferred out of the "estate" of the decedent as against the
claim of the surviving spouse under the election statutes?
II. THEORIES OF DECISION
The courts have refused to lay down rules broadly,12
and have not been consistent with one another or with
themselves. 3 The cases generally purport to rest on one
of the following theories:
Cf. (1943) 52 Yale L. J. 656; Kempton, How a Surviving Spou8e May
Be Disinherited (1940) N. Y. L. J. 294; Harris, Can Section 18, Decedent
Estate Law, Be Avoided? (1939) N. Y. L. J. 1644, 1664.
10 See BEECHLER, op. cit. supra, n. 4, 541, n. 51 for a sampling of the few
statutes there are.
" E.g., supra, n. 1.
12 E.g., Collins v. Collins, 98 Md. 473, 484, 57 A. 597 (1904): "Nothing
that we have said, however, is to be understood as going beyond the case
before us or as laying down the rule more broadly than to protect the
widow against a voluntary conveyance by the husband of all his estate,
made on the eve of his marriage without her knowledge and with the intent
of defeating her marital right."
"The Maryland Court of Appeals has admitted that its own cases are
not easy to fit into a consistent pattern, Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511,
517, 39 A. 2d 552 (1944). See also, the analysis of Vermnot law In Cahn,
supra, n. 2, 150.
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A. "Illusory" or "colorable" transfers." Many cases
hold a transfer ineffectual against a surviving spouse if it
is "illusory" or "colorable". 15 The test seems to be whether
the transfer, practically speaking, changed the position of
the donor as owner, i.e., whether "from the technical point
of view such a conveyance does not take back all that it
gives, but practically it does".' 6 Under this view, a man's
"estate" is what he in fact controlled during his lifetime. 7
This is the view taken in cases which determine the extent
of a decedent's estate for federal tax purposes." How far
a court will be "realistic" in determining who is the owner
of property, however, will depend on the firmness of the
1" See Comment, supra, n. 2, which traces the development of the doctrine
subsequent to the leading case of Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E.
2d 966 (1937). An "illusory" transfer is generally said to be one which on
its face shows that the practical control of the donor Is not disturbed;
"colorable" transfers are complete on their face but do not in fact alter
the status quo.
"Newman v. Dore, supra, n. 14; Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63
N. E. 1068 (1902) ; Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N. E.
2d 75 (1944) ; Krause v. Krause, 285 N. Y. 27, 32 N. E. 2d 779 (1941)
(applying the doctrine to savings bank, or "Totten" trusts) ; Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N. E. 2d 381 (1944). The cases in this field,
however, although purporting to go on one ground, are usually suipport-
able on others. In Newman v. Dore, 8upra, n. 14, for instance, practically
all the testator's assets were transferred and the transfer took place shortly
before his death.
1 Holmes, J., in Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 461, 63 N. E. 1068,
1069 (1902).
1" The cases generally hold that the decedent must have had virtually all
the prerogatives of ownership. Reservation of a life estate, if the gift of
the remainder is irrevocable, would probably be effective against the sur-
viving spouse. Cf. Leonard v. Leonard, supra, n. 15; Haskell v. Art Institute
of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N. E. 2d 736 (1940) (reservation for one
year by 81 year old, ill testator, who died within a year) ; Note, 64 A. L. R.
466, 473 (1930). But cf. Hays v. Henry, 1 Md. Ch. 337 (1848). Reservation
of a life estate plus an Intent to defeat the wife's claim, however, have
been held sufficient grounds for setting the transfer aside. Grover v. Clover,
69 Colo. 72, 169 Pac. 578 (1917).
The extreme form of this theory appears In Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,
supra, n. 15, which extends a spouse's statutory share to the assets of any
revocable trust. Accord: Report of the Commission of Revision of the
Laws of North Carolina Relating to Estates (1936) 34-37, approved in Note,
Protection of Widow's Statutory Share by Restricting Inter Vivos Transfers
of the Husband (1936), 46 Yale L. J. 884. Most states, however, do not
go so far, and in a recent Ohio case, Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72
N. E. 2d 378 (1947), while the court followed the Bolles case, three out of
seven judges dissented.
"1 See e.g., Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 444 (1933) (reserved
power to alter or amend, corpus of trust held part of decedent's gross
estate) ; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 117 (1940) (inter vivos trust
which on some contingency might revert to settlor held taxable to settlor's
estate even if the contingency does not occur).
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policy underlying the particular statute with reference to
which ownership is to be determined.19
Retention of control appears as the test in the early
Maryland cases. In Rabbitt v. Gaither," Judge Miller, sum-
marizing the law of earlier decisions,21 said:
"... if the transfer be colorable merely, that is to
say if it be a mere device or contrivance by which the
husband does not part with the absolute dominion over
the property during his life, but seeks thereby to defeat
the claims of his widow at his death, the law pronounces
it a fraud upon her rights, and this fraud may be proved
and established by his retention of possession, during
his life, by a reservation of an interest to himself on
the face of the conveyance, or by any outside agreement
or arrangement between him and his grantee or donee,
to the effect that he shall receive the benefit of, or have
control over, the property, during his life . . ." (italics
supplied).
Apart from the tax statutes, the Statute of Wills presents an analogy.
Balanced against the salutary reasons for the formality of execution re-
quired by the statute is the consideration that the obvious intention of
many testators may be defeated by what seems to be excessive technicality.
Some instruments therefore, which strictly speaking would seem to require
execution according to the Statute of Wills are nevertheless held valid
although they do not comply with that statute. Thus, revocable, amendable
trusts, in which income, possession and profits remain with the settlor
are held non-testamentary. The trust most nearly testamentary in its effect
which nevertheless has been held valid without the formalities of execution
required by the Statute of Wills is the "Totten" or tentative trust in
savings bank deposits. Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 (1899).
The New Jersey court, however, taking a strict position, has held that
savings bank trusts are void. Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co., 119 N. J. Eq.
408, 182 A. 912 (1936).
Statutes providing that only a certain proportion of property can be
bequeathed to charity, or that a charitable gift may not be made by a
will executed less than a certain time prior to the death of the testator
are held not violated if the prohibited transfer is made by revocable inter
vivos trust. Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N. E. 2d 627
(1938).
Obviously, the policy protecting a spouse against disinheritance will be
more vulnerable to judicial undermining than a tax statute, but perhaps
less vulnerable than the Statute of Wills. See ScoTT, TRusTs (1939) Secs.
57.5, 58.5, suggesting that though the Statute of Wills may not invalidate
a transfer, the election statute may do so.
67 Md. 94, 105, 8 A. 744 (1887).
21 As Judge Offutt pointed out in Jaworski v. Wisniewski, 149 Md. 109,
131 A. 40 (1925), Judge Miller's statement of the law is not clearly that
of the Court. Judge Miller thought that there was no participation by
the donee in the donor's purpose to defeat the surviving spouse's interest,
and would have held the gift good on that ground. The majority, not
deciding whether such participation is necessary before the transfer is set
aside, held that there was such participation; i.e., that the evidence showed
an agreement by the donee to leave the ownership in the donor during his
lifetime.
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This is one of the few explicit statements in the cases
as to just what a surviving spouse needs to prove in order
to upset a decedent's inter vivos conveyance. Although
Judge Miller spoke of "fraud",22 it is clear that if the law
will "pronounce" fraud when the transfer is colorable or
illusory, the basis of the decision is the colorable or illusory
character of the transfer.23
The language of the earlier cases cited in Rabbitt v.
Gaither bears out Judge Miller's statement of the law. In
Hays v. Henry24 a husband, with a view to preventing any
claim by his wife, conveyed his property to a mistress, who
immediately reconveyed to the donor in trust for herself
for life, remainder to his children by her. The reconveyance
contained a covenant that the husband was not to be dis-
turbed in his possession, control or enjoyment of the bene-
fits of the property during his lifetime. The transfer was
vacated, the Court remarking :215
"If the disposition of the husband be bona fide26
and no right is reserved to him, then, though made to
defeat the claim of the wife, it will be good against
her because an act cannot be denounced as fraudulent
which the law authorizes to be done. But if it be a
mere device or contrivance by which the husband, not
parting with the absolute dominion over the property
during his life, seeks, at his death, to deny his widow
that share of his personal estate which the law assigns
to her, then it will be ineffectual against her... Reten-
tion of possession is a badge of fraud."2 7
See section B, infra.
21 Of course, again the decision itself may be supported on other grounds
than the rule announced by Judge Miller. The conveyance was made for
the purpose of depriving the widow of her statutory share.
" Supra, n. 17.
Supra, n. 17, 338.
" Although the Court speaks of "bona fide" disposition this refers only
to the question of whether the prerogatives of ownership were reserved
and not whether testator had an intention to cut down the share of his
surviving spouse, since an absolute transfer, regardless of the purpose for
which it is made, would be good under this language. In Rabbitt v. Gaither,
supra, n. 20, 101, the Court said that this language plainly had "no refer-
ence to good faith on the part of the husband toward his wife but to the
transaction itself as between the husband and his transferee or donee. ...
The transfer ... must be absolutely unconditional".
11 Under the obsolete doctrine of Twyne's Case, Star Chamber 1601, 3
Coke 80B, when a "badge" of fraud is proved, the fraud is proved. Thus
fraud could be reduced to objective rules. It is curious that after a course
of reasoning which proves that fraud is not the test, the court adheres to
fiction and states its conclusion in terms of fraud.
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Dunnock v. Dunnock 2  announces the same rule, denying
relief because the conveyance was absolute on its face and
the evidence did not show any collateral arrangement
whereby the husband was to retain the fruits of ownership.
B. Fraud on Marital Rights. Fraud on marital rights is
at least the nominal theory of the Maryland cases, even
where it masks another theory, as in the line of cases
through Rabbitt v. Gaither. It is also the theory of the
Model Probate Code.29 Fraud in this context has no definite
meaning;" it is a statement of the result of the cases which
invalidate the transfer rather than a reason for reaching it.
And even as a verbal formula, the test of fraud may yield
to other considerations."'
The leading case rejecting fraud as a test is the New
York case, Newman v. Dore,2 which relies on the decision
of Justice Holmes in Leonard v. Leonard,3 recognizing the
question-begging character of the formula. The danger of
the theory is that since it begs the question it gives no
inkling of what is really controlling in the cases and is likely
to frustrate lawyers confronted with the practical question
of presenting evidence which is likely to be persuasive.31
- 3 Md. Ch. 140 (1852). Although the case came up on a bill for mainte-
nance, the Court treated the complainant as on a par with a surviving spouse.
Cf. Levin v. Levin, 166 Md. 451, 171 A. 77 (1934), involving a bill for divorce
and alimony in which the Court said that the wife stands higher than a
surviving spouse. But cf. Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537 (1855).
2 Model Probate Code, in SIMES AND BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW
(1946), Sec. 33 (a) : "Any gift made by a person, whether dying testate or
intestate, in fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse to share
in his estate shall, at the election of the surviving spouse, be treated as a
testamentary disposition and may be recovered from the donee and persons
taking from him without adequate consideration and applied to the payment
of the spouse's share, as in case of his election to take against the will."
1 Model Probate Code, Sec. 33 (a), Comment: "This section makes no
attempt to define the expression 'in fraud of marital rights'. It is believed
that only by judicial decision can that be done. [Other tests have been pro-
posed] but it is believed to be more satisfactory to say that it is fraudulent
as to the share of the surviving spouse. .... It is believed that no statute
could adequately indicate all cases which might properly be regarded as
actually or constructively fraudulent as to the share of the surviving
spouse." For criticism of the Model Probate Code provision on this point
see Niles, Model Probate Code and Monographs in Probate Law: A Review
(1947), 45 Mich. L. Rev. 321, 330.
'Whitehill v. Thiess, 161 Md. 657, 158 A. 347 (1932) (fraud not an
"absolute and invariable" test).
Supra, n. 14.
Supra, n. 15.
See also, Comment, 8upra, n. 2.
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C. Completeness of the transfer under general property
laws. The Maryland cases contain language indicating that
a surviving spouse may not upset a "complete" inter vivos
transfer. Thus a gift which is "complete" in that it need
not be executed with the formalities required for testamen-
tary dispositions by the Statute of Wills is said to be "com-
plete" insofar as a surviving spouse is concerned, since a
gift is either complete or it is not.35 The difficulty with this
theory is that it fails to take into consideration the fact
that the different statutes which in some particular limit
the power of testation represent different measures of the
validity of inter vivos transfers; the policy underlying one
such statute may be stronger or weaker than the policy
underlying another. The decisions, it is true, often do not
85 In Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 A. 523 (1915), the
Court holds that because an interest is "vested" in a trustee, although the
settlor reserved a life estate and power of revocation it could not be sham
or colorable. Curiously, the Court cites (at page 184), Hays v. Henry,
supra, n. 17, which, if it stands for anything, stands for the opposite con-
clusion. Poole v. Poole, 129 Md. 387, 99 A. 551 (1916) holds that a deed
on nominal consideration is a "complete transfer"; a complete transfer is
"absolute", and an absolute transfer cannot be colorable as against a sur-
viving spouse. Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378
(1927) reasons: retention of possession by the donor does not "invalidate"
a gift by way of a savings bank trust (citing Milholland v. Whalen, supra,
n. 19, which holds that savings bank trusts are not invalidated by the Statute
of Wills) ; a complete gift is "by its nature" complete as to all persons
(see page 659), and the test of completeness is the same whether the execu-
tor or the widow sues. There could therefore be no "fraud" if the only
intention of the donor was to make a "legally effective gift". This theory
would make it impossible for a wife to recover the assets of any savings
bank trust, and is inconsistent with the result in Mushaw v. Mushaw,
supra, n. 13, in which such a trust was set aside at the instance of the
widow. Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md. 271, 9 A. 2d 581 (1939)
argues that the proper test for determining whether a widow may recover
is whether the executor could sue to make the assets part of the "estate"
(at page 277). There can be no intent to defraud, therefore, where the
assets transferred are not part of the decedent's "estate".
Other jurisdictions reflect the same confusion. In re Schurer's Estate,
157 Misc. 573, 577, 284 N. Y. S. 28, 33 (1935), aff'd memo. 248 App. Div.
697, 289 N. Y. S. 818 (1936), the Court reasons: "The contention of the
objectant that she does not claim that the (savings bank) trusts are void
but merely claims that they are subject to her widow's interest, is obviously
a compromise argument. Surely if they are not part of the estate, they are
not part of the widow's interest. If they stand alone outside of the estate
and bear no element of fraud, no actual or constructive revocation, and are
subjected to no claims of creditors, the trusts are free and absolute." And
cf. Jones v. Somerville, 78 Miss. 269, 28 So. 940 (1900) ; Harris v. Harris,
147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N. P. 2d 378 (1947) (dissenting opinion). Some cases
have simply held certain types of transfers "testamentary" with respect
to the surviving spouse. Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 344 Mo.
1150, 130 S. W. 2d 611 (1939) (gift in contemplation of death). The term
"testamentary", however, like "fraud" seems merely a shorthand expression
of the conclusion that the transfer violates the policy of the election statutes.
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purport to rest on the "nature" of the transfer alone, but
their language may be highly misleading nevertheless. 6
Whether the test of validity of transfers attacked by a
surviving spouse under the election statutes is the same
as the test of validity under general property law may be
significant in determining who may have the transfer set
aside and to what extent. If the transfer is "by its nature"
invalid, the executor should be able to have it set aside
completely. If only the spouse's rights are violated, may
the executor sue, and how much of the gift is to be set
aside?"7 If, except for the rights of a surviving spouse, a
transfer would be valid, there would seem to be no reason
to invalidate it beyond the point necessary to give the
surviving spouse what she would have received had the
inter vivos transfer not been made.38 On the other hand,
most of the inter vivos transfers attacked under the election
statutes are of types which in effect are substantially like
wills, and it has been only after considerable hesitation
that the courts have held the requirements of the Statute
See supra, n. 19. Cf. the language of Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 13,
citing Milholland v. Whalen, supra, n. 19, as standing for the proposition
that a tentative trust "may be used as an alternative to the delivery of
the subject matter of the gift". If taken literally this would mean that
no tentative trust could be set aside by a wife, a conclusion negatived
by the Mushaw case itself. And cf. In re Clark's Estate, 149 Misc. 374,
268 N. Y. S. 253 (1933) (property in savings bank trust taxable in full
to settlor's estate because widow entitled to no part of it since gift is
complete. It was not "complete" enough to escape the tax to the donor's
estate, however).
I" Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank, supra, n. 35, states that whoever
brings suit, recovery is primarily on behalf of the estate and the assets
transferred should be brought into the estate, the widow obtaining her share
in the normal course of distribution. In Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 35,
the Court granted a decree as prayed to a widow who asked to have certain
bank accounts declared to be part of her husband's estate. In Jaworski
v. Wisniewski, supra, n. 21, a husband moved to set aside a deed which as
against anyone other than a surviving spouse would ordinarily be held
valid under the rule of Brown v. Mercantile Trust Co., 87 Md. 377, 40 A.
256 (1898). However, since the donor retained every practical benefit of
ownership, the Court set aside the deed and declared the property part
of the husband's estate. Likewise in Krause v. Krause, 285 N. Y. 27, 32
N. E. (2d) 779 (1941). See also Matter of Schurer, supra, n. 35. But see
inlra, n. 38. If it is conceded that the election statutes and the Statute
of Wills raise different questions of policy, then it would seem to follow
that the Maryland cases, which without analysis fashion the remedy as
If the policy underlying the two statutes were the same, are open to
question.
' Ibey v. Ibey, 93 N. H. 434, 43 A. 2d 157 (1945); see also President &
Directors of Manhattan Club v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 297, 14 N. Y. S. 2d
375,384 (1939).
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of Wills inapplicable to such transfers. 9 These "valid gifts",
therefore, may perhaps be so vulnerable that when attacked
by a surviving spouse, they may be upset completely." The
question has not been raised in the Maryland cases, but
query whether in any case an executor would be able to
sue after the donee paid the widow her full one-third share
of the transferred assets in settlement of her claim.4'
The dangerous extreme to which the theory that a
transaction is essentially "valid" or "invalid" may be car-
ried is illustrated in the Pennsylvania case, Beirne v. Conti-
nental Equitable Title & Trust Co."2 Testator in that case
left his Wife almost nothing in his will. During his lifetime
he made defendant trustee of a substantial sum for himself
for life, and on his death for certain named remaindermen.
He received all the income and could revoke or amend
the trust at will. The purpose of the trust was to deprive
his wife of her thirds. The Court held the trust "valid",
"formally effective", and that assets disposed of by valid
inter vivos trust cannot be part of the settlor's "estate".
The wife therefore recovered nothing. The decision in
effect permits anyone who can afford a lawyer to nullify
the election statutes. 3
"Such transfers include savings bank trusts and trusts with varying
degrees of revocability and control by the settlor.
"0 The Model Probate Code apparently accepts this conclusion. Sec. 33 (a)
provides that a transfer in fraud of the marital rights of surviving spouses
should be treated as a "testamentary disposition".
" The answer would seem to be that he could not. Where the transfer
Is valid under general property laws, only the surviving spouse has a claim
strong enough to upset it. The executor merely rides the spouse's coat-tail.
It is this fact which makes it difficult to understand why the transfer
should be set aside to a greater extent than is necessary to put the spouse
in the position in which she would have been if the transfer had not been
made. Under the Maryland authorities, therefore, it might be desirable
for decedent's donee to settle with the widow in a doubtful case and thus
possibly save at least two-thirds of the gift.
" 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721 (1932).
"The Court said that "actual fraud" would vitiate even a "valid trust"
but set aside a finding by the lower court that intent to deprive the
widow of her distributive share constituted such fraud. Thus, no matter
how flimsy the transfer or what the purpose of the donor in making it
may be, under this holding, if the transfer Is good under the Statute of
Wills It can never be attacked by a surviving spouse. Kerwin v. Donaghy,
317 Mass. 559, 59 N. E. 2d 299 (1945) goes to the same length. In that
case, reservation of equitable life estate, power to revoke, and intent to
deprive widow were held not to violate the widow's rights.
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III. CONTROLLING CONSIDERATIONS
It is apparent that the legal "tests" lead only to con-
fusion. In the Maryland cases, as has been seen, there are
echoes of several legal theories. Courts, however, weigh
more factors than the legal "tests" would seem to indicate.
To debate the merits of an ultimate legal test of the validity
of inter vivos transfers is to obscure the practical problem
of what considerations actually influence courts in reaching
their decision. It would be helpful if instead of speaking of
"fraud", the courts would speak of "violation of marital
rights", and indicate in factual terms rather than by words
of art the factors they deem relevant and the approximate
weight they are disposed to give to each. Judicial discretion
is best exercised if the factors to be considered are made
clear. Among such factors are the following:
A. Purpose to defeat the claim of the surviving spouse.
In some jurisdictions, it has been held that any inter vivos
gift, even where the donor retains no interest at all, may
be set aside by a surviving spouse if made with the express
purpose of defeating her statutory claim.44 In Maryland,
however, as in most states, the law is otherwise. If willing
to cut off his nose, the donor is allowed to spite his face. 5
It is where the donor retains the fruits of ownership that
his purpose is significant as one of the elements entering
into "fraud".46 No clear clue, however, is given as to what
"E.g., Ibey v. Ibey, supra, n. 38.
"Hays v. Henry, supra, n. 17; Poole v. Poole, supra, n. 35. The conclusion
Is put on the ground of the protection of trade and commerce. It would be
burdensome to require careful scrutiny of all transfers by the husband
for something so elusive as motive. The Court fails to consider the
intermediate position that only gratuitous transferees of the donee need
be subject to the surviving spouse's claim. Cf. Model Probate Code, Sec.
33 (a) ; Kernan v. Carter, 132 Md. 577, 583, 140 A. 530 (1918) ; Sturgis v.
Citizens' National Bank, supra, n. 35; Rabbitt v. Gaither, supra, n. 20;
Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra, n. 35; Dunnock v. Dunnock, supra,
n. 28. Niles, Model Probate Code and Monographs in Probate Law: A Re-
view, supra, n. 30, suggests that if motive is made the test, improvement
of land might be discouraged since donees would not take a chance on the
outcome of judicial scrutiny. This rationale, of course, would not apply
to gifts of personalty.
,1 Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank, 8upra, n. 35, citing Rabbitt v. Gaither,
supra, n. 20, which really stands for the proposition that retention is all
that is necessary to be proved in order to set a transfer aside. See Feigley
v. Feigley, supra, n. 28. This was an action for alimony (cf. 8upra, n. 28),
which the Court treated as controlled by the principles governing the
claims of surviving spouses. The true test whether a transfer may be set
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is necessary to prove a purpose to defeat the surviving
spouse's claim,47 and although such purpose be proved, it
will not necessarily be conclusive in setting aside the
transfer even where the donor retains the prerogatives of
ownership.4"
B. Retention of control by donor. Retention of control
in the Maryland cases is evidence of the donor's purpose
to defeat his spouse's claim." It seems to be a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for setting aside inter vivos
transfers." A distinction has been suggested based on the
degree of control retained."' The more fully the preroga-
aside was said to be whether it was made with the purpose of depriving
her of the assets transferred. The case is cited interchangeably with those
involving surviving spouses. See, e.g., Sanborn v. Lang, 41 Md. 107, 114
(1874). Kerwin v. Donaghy, supra, n. 43, refuses, when dealing with a
claim based on the election statutes, to follow the analogy of transfers
attacked while the donor is still alive. Cf. also Bullen v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., supra, n. 35 ("intent" is the test) ; Jaworski v. Wisniewski,
supra, n. 21, (combination of intent to deprive and substantial control
by donor) ; Sanborn v. Lang, supra, (combination of Intent and control,
flagrant facts) ; Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 13 ("explicit or implicit
purpose of defrauding the widow"-the Court found a purpose to defeat
the claim of the widow from the fact that the transfer could not pos-
sibly have had any other effect, and the testator must have intended the
natural results of his acts).
' In Nichols v. Nichols, 61 Vt. 426, 431, 18 A. 153, 154 (1889), It was held
that intent to defeat a spouse's rights will be presumed from the knowledge
that those rights will in fact be defeated. Cf. Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra,
n. 46. Thus acting "knowing that" would equal acting "for the purpose of".
This is not law in Vermont today. Patch v. Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 409, 165
A. 919, 920 (1933). Many cases, such as Patch v. Squires, supra, require
"clear and convincing proof" of such intent. See, e.g., Sturgis v. Citizens'
National Bank, supra, n. 35. Inadequacy of consideration has been held
a basis for inference of such an intent in Thayer v. Thayer, 14 Vt. 107
(1842), but in Feigley v. Feigley, supra, n. 28, a conveyance to a sister of
property worth about $700 for a consideration of $200 was held not
fraudulent per 8e as against a wife. Of course, direct testimony of dece-
dent's contemporary statement of his purpose is sufficient. Sanborn v. Lang,
supra, n. 46. Anything short of that, however, seems most uncertain.
"Purpose to defeat claim of spouse shown, but relief not granted In
Whitehill v. Thiess, supra, n. 31; Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank, supra,
n. 35.
11 Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank, 8upra, n. 35; Mushaw v. Mushaw,
supra, n. 13 (retention of possession evidence of fraud).
5See supra, n. 46. Yet query when retention of control becomes so flagrant
that purpose will be presumed from retention. Cf. Harris, Can Section 18,
Decedent Estate Law, Be Avoided? supra, n. 9: "It is difficult to conceive
of a situation in which a spouse could divest himself of all his property.
retaining the right to the income, without harboring the intent to defeat the
surviving spouse's rights."
"Cf. supra, n. 17. See Comment, supra, n. 2. Sturgis v. Citizens' National
Bank, supra, n. 35 suggests a distinction between ordinary control and con-
trol as a trustee, holding that a trustee has no such control as will vitiate
a gift. This distinction seems without merit if the trustee is also the sole
beneficiary during his lifetime and especially if he can revoke the "trust"
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tives of ownership are retained, the stronger the case of
the surviving spouse. No Maryland cases, however, seem
to have turned on this distinction.
C. Other provisions made for the surviving spouse. A
Michigan decision, Rose v. Rose,52 is the leading case holding
that a transfer could not be set aside by a surviving spouse
who was reasonably provided for by the decedent. This
consideration seldom appears explicitly in other jurisdic-
tions, 3 but was stressed in Mushaw v. Mushaw,54 which
took cognizance of the confused state of the Maryland law
and offered this theory to reconcile the conflicting Maryland
decisions.5 Provision for the surviving spouse may be rea-
sonable despite disparity between the amount of decedent's
gross estate and the amount given to the survivor; the
test is reasonableness under all the circumstances."
at will. It is based on the confusion of the election statutes with the law
of gifts. But cf. in re Clark's Estate, 8upra, n. 36, which argues that the
only right given by the election statutes is to property left by will, and
degree of control, provided the property be "given" inter vivos, is immaterial.
300 Mich. 73, 1 N. W. 2d 458 (1942).
See Comment, supra, n. 2, n. 47. The New York statute takes into con-
sideration the extent of the provision made for the surviving spouse. New
York Decedent Estate Law, Sec. 18, provides as to the analogous question
of when a wife may renounce a will: "Where the will contains an absolute
legacy or devise whether general or specific, to the surviving spouse, of or
in excess of the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars and also a provision
for a trust for his or her benefit for life of a principal equal to or more
than the excess between said legacy or devise and his or her intestate
share, no right of election whatever shall exist in the surviving spouse ...
Where the intestate share is over twenty-five hundred dollars and where
the testator has devised or bequeathed in trust an amount greater than
the intestate share, with income thereof payable to the suriviving spouse
for life, the surviving spouse shall have the limited right to take the sum
of twenty-five hundred dollars absolutely, which shall be deducted from
the principal of such trust fund and the terms of the will shall otherwise
remain effective." Provisions with regard to a trust include legal life
estates, annuities, or any other form of income for life created by will
for the benefit of the surviving spouse.
Supra, n. 13.
5Reasonable provisions made and transfer sustained in Brown v. Fidelity
Trust Co., supra, n. 35; Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank, supra, n. 35;
Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., supra, n. 35. Reasonable provisions not
made and transfers set aside in Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 13, Jaworski
v. Wisniewski, supra, n. 21; Collins v. Collins, 8upra, n. 12; Sanborn v.
Lang, supra, n. 46.
0 Kernan v. Carter, supra, n. 45. Disparity between the gross estate of
the decedent and the amount of the bequest to the surviving spouse is a
factor in considering reasonableness, however. In the Kernan case, where
the widow was incompetent, a bequest to her of a relatively small amount
sufficient, however, to take care of her needs was held to preclude an
action by her to set aside an inter vivos transfer (alternative holding).
When a number of small inter vivo8 transfers have the cumulative effect of
diminishing the portion of the surviving spouse beyond the point of reason-
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D. Time between transfer and death of donor. The
Model Probate Code, Section 33 (b) provides: "Any gift
made by a married person within two years before the
time of his death is deemed to be in fraud of the marital
rights of his surviving spouse unless shown to the con-
trary. 5 7 While the cases place less emphasis on the time
element than the Model Probate Code, they do take into
consideration the short interval between the transfer and
the donor's death.58
E. Moral Claim of Surviving Spouse and Others. The
relative equities of the complainant and the other inter-
ested parties frequently enter into the decisions. 9 In this
respect the following factors seem to be significant:
(1) Claimant's treatment of decedent.60
(2) Abandonment of decedent by claimant."
ableness, the most recent transfer might be set aside, or all might be made
to contribute proportionately until the spouse is reasonably provided for;
or the spouse might conceivably have all the transfers set aside once she
establishes that she is not reasonably provided for. Apparently the prob-
lem has been seldom discussed.
"' The emphasis on the time element in the Model Probate Code is perhaps
due to the fact that a transfer made shortly before death involves something
of the favor of contemplation of death; such a transfer is so nearly
"testamentary" that the property falls within the "estate" of the donor
more easily thaj property transferred when death was not imminent. But
just what vuld the executor, on whom the burden of proof rests (Model
Probate Code, Sec. 33 (b), Comment) have to show under this section?
I See Thayer v. Thayer, supra, n. 47. There is some tendency to hold
gifts made shortly before death as "gifts causa mortis" against a wife,
whatever this means. See Note, 64 A.. L. R. 466, 485 (1930). In Newman
v. Dore, 8upra, n. 14, the Court pointed out that the transfer took place
only three days before the death of the donor. The related question of the
health of the donor was adverted to in Re Wrone's Estate, 177 Misc. 541,
31 N. Y. S. 2d 191 (1941). In Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 13, the Court
stressed the fact that decedent was 75 years old and in ill health, and that
the transfer took place less than a week before his death.
.See, e.g., Sanborn v. Lang, supra, n. 46, 119: "No moral justification or
excuse for (decedent's) extraordinary conduct."
'' Sanborn v. Lang, supra, n. 46, 118, remarks on the faithful performance
by the widow of her wifely duties. Pleadings often allege that marital duties
were faithfully performed.
61 New York Decedent Estate Law, Sec. 18, Pars. 4, 5, provides that no
hushand who has refused or neglected to provide for his wife or has
abandoned her and no wife who has abandoned her husband shall have
the right to elect the statutory share. It is questionable whether an invari-
able rule should be laid down. In Whitehill v. Thiess, 8upra, n. 31, the hus-
band, who had deserted his wife, did not succeed in setting aside the transfer
although (a) the deed was made for the purpose of defeating his rights,
(b) virtually the whole estate was conveyed, and (c) the wife retained
practical ownership during her lifetime. In Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra,
n. 13, the court remarked that there was no evidence of estrangement, and
the parties continued to share the same bedroom till the husband's death.
In Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank, supra, n. 35, where the claimant was
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(3) Duration of marriage; whether the marriage is a
first or subsequent marriage. 62
(4) Disparity of age between surviving spouse and de-
cedent.63
(5) Whether claimant is husband or wife.64
(6) Whether claimant has separate funds. 5
(7) Superiority of moral claim of donee.6"
F. Participation by donee in the "fraud". A dictum in
Rabbitt v. Gaither suggests that transfers should be set
aside where the donee participates in the "fraud". This
test, which is drawn from an entirely different context in
the law of fraudulent conveyances, seems not to have been
mentioned in any other case.
It would seem that if the transaction as far as the donor
is concerned would be sufficient to deprive his spouse of
her statutory share, it should not become illegal merely
because someone other than the donor knew about it. The
unsuccessful, the parties had been estranged for ten years before resuming
cohabitation five years before decedent died. But cf. Jaworski v. Wisniewski,
8upra, n. 21, where husband and wife lived together for ten years after the
altercation leading to the conveyance; Thayer v. Thayer, supra, n. 47,
where claimant who abandoned decedent still had the transfers set aside.
12In Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 13, the husband and wife had been
married for seven years, and the claimant was successful. Explicit reference
in the cases to duration of marriage is infrequent.
18In Duttera v. Babylon, 83 Md. 536, 35 A. 64 (1896), the question was
whether the conveyance to a wife was obtained by undue influence. Held,
mere disparity in age is not conclusive of undue influence. It might,
however, be a factor to be considered in the present connection, although
seldom stressed in the cases.
The Maryland statute, supra, n. 1, places husband and wife on a par.
It is hardly possible to tell whether as a matter of judicial psychology, a
wife is nevertheless in a superior position. Harrison v. Prentice, supra,
n. 7, seems to apply the statute without regard to whether claimant is
husband or wife.
1 Some states have attempted to measure the share of a surviving spouse
according to actual need. See Cahn, supra, n. 2. No Maryland cases have
been found discussing this point.
65The consideration of the strength of the moral claim of the surviving
spouse as against other claimants underlies the Maryland statute itself,
supra, n. 1. The widow's share is less if there are close surviving next of
kin than if the next of kin are distant. In Hays v. Henry, 8upra, n. 17,
the donee was the mistress of the donor and the transfer was set aside.
In Poole v. Poole, supra, n. 35, the Court stressed that decedent's child would
be hurt if the challenged deed were cancelled. Whitehill v. Thiess, supra,
n. 31, held that where money for the purchase of the property was given
to a mother by her children, and she took a life estate with powers,
remainder to the children, the children had a strong moral claim although
strictly speaking the money belonged to the mother after the gift. The
Court argued that "really" the children gave the property to their mother
in the first place, and a stranger may give property subject to whatever
restraints and with whatever purpose he wishes, without giving cause to
the donee's spouse to complain. Mason v. Johnson, 47 Md. 347 (1877).
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protection of the wife is a matter of policy independent
of the "punishment" of the donee."'
G. Testate or intestate decedent. This distinction has
caused confusion in the law of New York and other juris-
dictions, but so far has not found its way into the Maryland
cases.68 The argument in this regard is that in intestacy,
the Statute of Descent and Distribution governs. A spouse
inheriting by dint of that statute is on a par with every
other person who so succeeds to property. If an inter vivos
transfer, therefore, is valid as against other next of kin, it
is valid as against a surviving spouse in intestacy. Only the
election statutes give spouses any special protection, and
those statutes do not apply unless the decedent has left a
will. The argument has been rejected in Schnakenberg v.
Schnakenberg.6 9 It is submitted that the Schnakenberg case
is sound.70
H. Consent of spouse during lifetime. Mere failure to
protest during the decedent's lifetime will not bar the
survivor from later asserting a claim against inter vivos
transfers.71 If the survivor actually consents to the trans-
"Query what would be the result, even assuming there is force in this
test, where the purpose of the transfer is to defeat the widow's claim but
there is no agreement between the parties reserving any rights in the
property to the donor? Would it be sufficient if the donor merely trusted
the donee? Would it make any difference if the donee broke the "trust"?
In any event, this test would seem to be inapplicable to an "illusory"
transfer like a savings bank trust, where donees seldom even know of their
rights to the account and could not obtain it during the decedent's lifetime
if they did.
18 Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 915
(1939).
1"262 App. Div. 234, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 841 (1941).
'It would be difficult to explain to a layman that a husband may cut
his wife off with nothing by putting his estate into the form of tentative
trusts and leaving no will, but that she would get her thirds if, after setting
up the trusts he bequeathed her a substantial part of his "estate". This
anomaly in the New York law is underscored by the case of Newman v.
Dore, supra, n. 14, where the will was so drawn that renunciation was
precluded by the terms of Sec. 18 of the Decedent Estate Law, since the
wife received a life estate in a trust of one-third of the real and personal
estate of the decedent. While the inter vivo8 gifts were set aside in that
case as illusory, the wife's relief was not based on her right to renounce
and claim through the election statutes.
"Levy v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63, 43 A. 2d 25 (1945) (antenuptial agree-
ment). The conclusion is based on the policy of the law in favor of
domestic harmony. A stronger reason where the claim is based on the
election statutes would seem to be that there is nothing which a wife
may do to annul a transfer during her husband's lifetime, since her statutory
right arises only at the husband's death. Where it would be useless for
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fer, a different question is raised. The cases dealing with
the related question of the release of a surviving spouse's
share under the election statutes would probably be per-
suasive. Barroll v. Brice 2 holds that a spouse may release
his distributive share, but such waiver must be with full
knowledge of his rights and the facts. The Court requires
strong evidence of waiver, but the precise formalities neces-
sary to make it effective are not stated.13  Likewise,
Jaworski v. Wisniewski 4 recognizes that a spouse may re-
nounce his distributive share, but the case holds that while
a sale by a husband to a wife of his share of property
held by them as tenants by the entireties does make the
property part of the wife's separate estate, it does not
necessarily release the husband's legal right based on the
election statute. Consent to inter vivos transfers which
would, in the absence of such consent, violate the marital
rights of the surviving spouse, might thus be effective, but
it would be subject to careful scrutiny and considerable
legal formality would probably be required.3
I. Type of assets transferred. Gifts of the proceeds of
life insurance policies on the life of the decedent spouse
have been held effective against a surviving spouse not-
withstanding that the insured reserved the right to change
the beneficiary. 6 Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,"
her to protest, failure to protest should not prejudice her rights. Ante-
nuptial transfers have been set aside during the donor's lifetime, on the
ground that the conveyance was "fraudulent". LeStrange v. LeStrange,
242 App. Div. 74, 273 N. Y. S. 21 (1934).
' 115 Md. 498, 80 A. 1035 (1911).
,3 Apparently, consideration is not necessary, since lack of consideration,
If fatal to waiver, would have disposed of the case. Prudence would require
at least a writing under seal. The New York statute, Sec. 18 (9) prescribes
subscription and acknowledgment. Though it is silent concerning con-
sideration, the New York cases have subjected waivers to close scrutiny
for fraud or duress in the absence of consideration. They have, however,
refused to apply the general principles of estoppel against a surviving
spouse, holding that waiver, to be effective, must comply with the require-
ments of form imposed by the statute. See BECHLER, op. cit. supra, n. 4,
472-562.
11 Supra, n. 21.
"I It has been held that consent in writing or of record will bar a sur-
viving spouse of his distributive share. Bacus v. Burns, 48 Okla. 285, 149
Pac. 1115 (1915).
"Mitchell v. Mitchell, 265 App. Div. 27, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 612 (1942).
77 Supra, n. 35, 278: "The proceeds of life insurance policies have never
been regarded as part of the personal estate of the deceased unless payable
to the estate." But see Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 811 (g).
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holding that a surviving spouse may not share in proceeds
of an insurance policy payable to a beneficiary other than
the decedent's estate, has been supported on the ground
that it deals with a life insurance trust.7 Joint tenancies
in savings accounts are likewise put on a special footing,
even though the deceased had full control during his life-
time.79 If the law is to work out a consistent policy for
the protection of surviving spouses, the form of the assets
should not be controlling.
J. Transfer before or after marriage. Antenuptial trans-
fers are treated differently from postnuptial. There is an
element of fraud (in its meaningful sense of misrepresenta-
tion inducing reliance) in concealing the transfer. While
the apparent ownership of property is not, conventionally,
the reason why ladies marry their husbands, the law prop-
erly regards it as a consideration. 0 However, the leading
Maryland case involving premarital transfers, Collins v.
Collins,"' reasons from post-nuptial transfers, relying on the
line of cases beginning with Hays v. Henry.2
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem presented by these cases calls for the dis-
criminating exercise of judicial discretion. While discretion
necessarily involves uncertainties, 3 which are perhaps even
78 See Comment, 8upra, n. 2, 158.
1Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53 N. E. 2d 126 (1944) ; Inda v. Inda,
288 N. Y. 315, 43 N. E. 2d 59 (1942) ; Note, (1943) 52 Yale L. J. 656. If the
Inda case is to remain law in New York, then a form of deposit creating
a joint tenancy under the New York Banking Law, even though the "joint
tenant" beneficiary knows nothing about the "gift" is a foolproof method
for defeating the claims of a surviving spouse and undermines the result
of Newman v. Dore, supra, n. 14. Mushaw v. Mushaw, supra, n. 13, states
that savings bank trusts should not be treated any differently from any
other inter vivos transfers in determining the rights of a surviving spouse.
10 Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh. 279 Mass. 238, 181 N. E. 181 (1932).
"I Supra, n. 12. The case involved an antenuptial transfer without con-
sideration, without knowledge of the bride-to-be, but no "actual misrepre-
sentation" was made. The transfer was made with the purpose of depriving
the wife of her marital rights and a great deal of benefit and control
was reserved by the husband. Concealment of the transfer was held fraud
per se. In any event, it would seem that misrepresentation by conduct is
as "actual" as misrepresentation by words.
Supra, n. 17.
The uncertainty of aims and lack of fundamental pattern of the law
with regard to ante-mortenm transfers is highlighted by comparison with
the law of powers. In the absence of statute, creditors may not reach
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desirable where considerations of policy are delicately bal-
anced, the confusion in the cases seems unnecessarily in-
creased by a hazy delineation of the precise problem to be
solved, by the tendency of the cases to try to fit facts
into one precedent or another without fundamental analysis
of the ratio decidendi, by the use of question-begging for-
mulas such as "fraud", and by the citation of cases incon-
sistent with the proposition for which they are cited. As the
law now stands, therefore, the lawyer seeking some mea-
sure of practical guidance from the cases is confronted with
confusion worse confounded than should be necessary. 4
assets of a donor merely because the donor has reserved a power of
revocation, but may reach the assets only to the extent that the power is
actually exercised. See Scorr, CASES ON TRUSTS (3d ed. 1940) 213, n.;
Note, 92 A. L. R. 282 (1934) ; cf. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Bergdorf Trust Co.
167 Md. 158, 173 A. 31 (1934). If this is so of creditors, it might be
argued, then how can a surviving spouse, who is a volunteer, reach the
assets when the power is not exercised? The argument would emasculate
the election statutes, but it serves to underscore the lack of integration
in the law as it stands.
81 Niles, supra,, n. 30, argues that the proper solution is an explicit statute
setting forth just what facts a surviving spouse need establish in order
to be able to have an inter vivos transfer set aside. There seem, however,
to be too many variables to make such a statute practical. And there is
always the difficulty that astute lawyers may circumvent the policy of such
a statute and yet keep within the letter. On the other hand, almost every
case now invites litigation, and there is perhaps something to be said for
the position that the elegance of expensive tailor-made decisions does not
outweigh the practical advantages of a standard pattern of statutory
regulation.
